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TERRY COLLITS
In an essay written in the 1930s, Bertolt Brecht referred to the dangers of
accepting too readily received ideas of the ‘eternal truths’ concerning
ancient tragedies. As an example, he argued that most productions of Sopho-
cles’ Oedipus the King perpetuate highly questionable assumptions about
the nature of ‘the tragic hero’:
The individual whose innermost being is thus driven into the open
then of course comes to stand for Man with a capital M. Everyone
(including every spectator) is then carried away by the momentum
of the events portrayed, so that in a performance of Oedipus one
has for all practical purposes an auditorium of little Oedipuses.1
This comment reflects the distinctive ideas about theatre that Brecht was
then developing, both in direct theoretical discussions and in his own theat-
rical practices. In the period that saw the rise of Fascism in Germany, his
project was to create a political theatre. Among other things, the historical
materialist basis of Brecht’s politics encouraged him to replace universal
statements about the nature of ‘Man’ with direct engagements with historical
specificities both past and present.2 In this instance, his scepticism is directed
towards the supposedly universal and unchanging truths about human life
that are enshrined in the figure of Sophocles’ Oedipus. Both as writer and
director, Brecht sought to replace the idea that an ineluctable fate determines
the tragic hero’s destiny with more ‘progressive’ concepts. To do this, he felt
it necessary to re-align the relationship between stage and auditorium by
changing the passively receptive spectator of current and traditional theatre
(which he labelled ‘Aristotelian’) for one who was politically and intellectu-
ally alert.3 Brecht refused what he considered to be the pacifying agency of
Aristotle’s catharsis—whereby the audience’s pity and fear in the face of the
tragic spectacle are somehow calmed—and wanted to produce instead a
theatre-going public that would debate the rights and wrongs of what was
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turning a sharper analytical spotlight on the alternative narrative of Laius’
death at the hands of robbers. This in turn led to greater attention being paid
to gaps and discrepancies in the text as opposed to simply admiring its per-
fection of form and clarity of meaning. Certainly, some readers across the
ages had never accepted that the play was clearly constructed. Most
famously, Voltaire had noted its inconsistencies,7 and saw these simply as
the result of poor workmanship and a sign that Sophocles had been greatly
overpraised; he even wrote his own version of the Oedipus story to demon-
strate how the wrinkles could be ironed out! But Voltaire, for all his famed
iconoclasm, was trapped in neo-classical theories of art and literature, and as
a child of the Enlightenment was not drawn to non-rational elements in the
ways complex texts work. More recent readings have found in those very
wrinkles sources of new insights and dramatic power in the play. 
The story of the robbers
Some scholars tried to eradicate what they must have taken to be errors. In his
much-used translation of the play, E. F. Watling8 removes an apparent textual
inconsistency from Oedipus’ response to Creon’s report of the eyewitness
who stated that King Laius had been murdered by many ‘robbers’:
CREON: His story was that robbers—not one but many—
Fell in with the King’s party and put them to death.
OEDIPUS: Robbers would hardly commit such a daring outrage—
Unless they were paid to do it by someone here. (122-25)
This moment in the play marks the beginning of Oedipus’ conspiracy theory,
that the former King had been the victim of a political assassination that had
been covered up.9 It starts him down the road of suspicion that leads to his
fierce accusations against both Teiresias and Creon. His scepticism
regarding this ‘official’ story of what happened to Laius provides both a clue
to the ways his mind works and an indication of the rational basis of his
accusations against Teiresias and Creon in the charged scenes that follow. 
But the Greek text (like most translations) does not support the transla-
tion quoted above; instead, it reveals a different kind of error. Despite the
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presented on the stage. That is why he objected to productions of Sophocles’
Oedipus that encourage audiences simply to acquiesce in Oedipus’ accept-
ance of his guilt and predetermined fate as foretold by priests and oracles.
Since Brecht’s time much has changed both in the field of theatre prac-
tice and literary interpretation. But because many of the underlying assump-
tions derived from neoclassical concepts of tragedy and the generally
accepted meaning of this play in particular die hard, this essay seeks to con-
tinue the work of developing more flexible readings of Oedipus the King.
Brecht’s comment points to that moment in the drama when Oedipus is
finally brought to accept that the words of the various oracles were right all
along and that the terrible fate laid down for him before his birth could
never have been evaded. This article will start there, and explore the
possibility that the audience in the theatre need not make the same assump-
tions as Oedipus, which would be impossible for an audience of ‘little Oedi-
puses’. Most traditional readings of this Athenian tragedy assume that the
spectators probably reach the conclusion of Oedipus’ double guilt long
before he does; indeed the most common assumption that persists regarding
the relationship between Greek tragedies and their sources is the idea that
the spectators came into the theatre possessed of certain knowledge of the
narrative outcome. Despite that, Sophocles’ Oedipus is often said to work
like a detective story: if that is true, then it is surely an unimpressive detec-
tive story whose final revelations are clearly anticipated early in the play.
The peculiar pleasure this is meant to afford the audience must derive from
their superior knowledge over that of the hapless Oedipus.
The possibility of reading Oedipus differently or of producing a plau-
sible ‘Brechtian moment’ for this revered work received impetus from the
‘theoretical revolution’ in the Humanities in the 1970s.4 Probing analyses of
the structures of narrative led to a radical reconsideration of the assumption
of Oedipal guilt, especially in relation to his (alleged) killing of his father
Laius, the former King of Thebes.5 Potentialities in the text were revealed
that had not emerged over the previous two and a half thousand years.6 Their
subsequent reverberations were felt particularly in the fields of narratology,
hermeneutics and—given the centrality of Sophocles’ Oedipus in Sigmund
Freud’s theories—psychoanalysis. This outcome was produced firstly by
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the play began with a solemn religious supplication, by the time of this
exchange the dialogue has taken on a distinctly forensic tone.
What does this curious discrepancy over ‘many’ or ‘one’ signify? Is it a
sign that Oedipus has (unconsciously?) already identified himself as the mur-
derer—the single murderer? Or could it indicate that Oedipus is starting on the
trail of an idea that a conspiracy in Thebes had led to the political assassina-
tion of his predecessor—a conspiracy masterminded by none other that
Creon, the individual who stands in front of him at this very moment, and who
will moreover eventually claim the throne? Or is it there simply to unsettle the
audience by demonstrating the maddening capacity there is for all reportage to
produce slippages and errors? Or should we take it as a revealing slip of the
tongue, remembering Freud’s great insight that a parapraxis reveals truths
beyond its simple surface meaning—repressed truths indeed? Or is Voltaire
right, that Sophocles just wasn’t always a careful writer?
Whose words to trust?
The forensic tone of Oedipus’ cross-examination of Creon about his visit to
the Delphic oracle has further structural significance in the drama. To dis-
cover why the city of Thebes is beset by a ‘plague’, Oedipus, as a king who
acts for the welfare of his people, has sent Creon to Delphi to discover
whether the oracle of Apollo can shed light on their affliction. The answer
he receives re-opens questions about the mysterious death of Laius many
years before: the murder of a king has gone unrequited, and the murderer is
still living in the city of Thebes. Oedipus’ first move to discover the truth,
then, is to seek divine intervention through the agency of an oracle—a reli-
gious and traditional act that befits the older world order represented in the
epics and still a common (though declining) practice in the Greek world of
Sophocles.12 His second move, as is revealed in the passage of dialogue with
Creon quoted above, is more ‘modern’. His appraisal of the testimony of the
witness, however slight it might appear, is that it constitutes evidence: ‘One
thing could hold the key to it all, / A small beginning gives us grounds for
hope’ (137-38). This is the language of rational inquiry, of the courts and of
those new sciences that were already displacing the theologically based sci-
ences of the Greeks of the seventh and sixth centuries BCE.13 Oedipus’
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heavy emphasis Creon places on the plurality of the ‘robbers’, Oedipus’
reply turns the witness’s testimony into a single ‘robber’.10 Because this is
an important turning point in the action, I will now quote the exchange more
fully, this time from the translation of Robert Fagles:11
OEDIPUS:
No messenger, no fellow-traveler saw what happened?
Someone to cross-examine?
CREON:
No,
they were all killed but one. He escaped,
terrified, he could tell us nothing clearly,
nothing of what he saw—just one thing.
OEDIPUS:
What’s that?
One thing could hold the key to it all,
a small beginning gives us grounds for hope.
CREON:
He said thieves attacked them—a whole band,
not single-handed, cut King Laius down.
OEDIPUS:
A thief
so daring, so wild, he’d kill a king? Impossible,
unless conspirators paid him off in Thebes. (132-42)
Strangely, Oedipus does not seem to hear what Creon has just told him.
Later in the play he will insist more than once that if the witness’s claim that
Laius was killed by ‘many robbers’ were true then he, Oedipus, was not the
murderer. But at the point when he first hears this important testimony he
modifies Creon’s account by turning ‘many robbers’ into one. If it is a rea-
sonable assumption that the Athenian spectators at the drama—as potential
jurors, and living in what was still largely an oral culture—were accustomed
to discriminating precisely between conflicting accounts presented in a trial,
it is also likely that they would be attentive to such crucial details regarding
the murder scene itself. We might also note that while this opening scene of
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The Priest’s pious hesitancy about what degree of honour is due to
Oedipus has political implications that become explicit in the note of
warning he strikes at the end of his speech: the honour due to Oedipus—
unlike the gods or even the Homeric heroes who retain their epithets regard-
less of circumstances—is qualified and conditional. Unlike those older
patriarchs, Oedipus’ power depends on his achievements and will survive
only as long as it is supported by achievement. The crisis of the plague at
Thebes threatens Oedipus’ political power; as he himself recognizes, he is
the king of a diseased city and is firmly locked into the city’s ailment:
Well I know
You are sick to death, all of you.
But sick as you are, not one is sick as I. (71-73)
Just as this moment is richer in meaning than its simple irony that exposes
Oedipus’ ignorance of his ‘true’ predicament, the intriguing uncertainties of
the opening scene of the play should not be taken to reveal some character
defect in Oedipus himself—as they often are by critics who look for a sup-
posed arrogance in Oedipus to account for and (more bizarrely) justify his
fate.16 In his very opening speech, for example, when Oedipus declares
himself to be ‘world-famous’ (‘you all know me, the world knows my fame:
/ I am Oedipus’) he is not indulging a personal arrogance. As the great nine-
teenth-century editor of Sophocles, Sir Richard Jebb, crisply notes: ‘The
tone is Homeric’.17 That is, the opening speech declares that this play, like
other Greek tragedies, is a representation of the story of a hero derived from
the world of the epics. But this hero will be a tragic and not a Homeric hero,
a man who exists in a very different world from that of the epics. The tragic
hero is an epic hero rendered problematical; or, as Jean-Pierre Vernant and
Pierre Vidal-Naquet put it:
As we have seen, as long as it remains alive tragedy derives its
themes from the legends of the heroes. The fact that it is rooted in a
tradition of myths explains why it is that in many respects one finds
more religious archaisms in the great tragedians than in Homer. At
the same time, tragedy establishes a distance between itself and the
myths of the heroes that inspire it and that it transposes with great
freedom. It scrutinizes them. It confronts heroic values and ancient
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eclectic and ‘transactional’ approach to discovering truth, along with his
openness to more than one mode of inquiry, define him precisely as a repre-
sentative contemporary Athenian.14
Despite his respectful acknowledgement of the Delphic Apollo, the lan-
guage Oedipus uses throughout his interrogation of Creon has a focus that
derives not from the sacred (and notoriously imprecise) discourses of religion
and oracles but from the new institutions of the Athenian democracy. The
wider historical narrative this invokes matches that of Aeschylus’ Oresteia,
which traces the trajectory of Greek culture from the earlier forms of retribu-
tive justice of a priest- and god-governed world to the Athenian law courts.
Like Aeschylus, Sophocles represents that narrative in terms of dramatic con-
flict. In the tragic competitions of the Festival of Dionysus, both dramas
played the cultural role of staging problems inherent in the seismic shift that
was the democratic revolution of Athens. In the new world order they were
creating, where should the Athenians turn in order to discover truth? Oedipus’
second approach is to put his faith in the power of rational deduction. Both
science and jurisprudence are concerned with the weighing and interpretation
of evidence: ‘One thing could hold the key to it all’.
While most dramatic texts can be staged in more than one way,15 the stage
setting for Oedipus the King can certainly be used to indicate a structural divi-
sion between new and old. There are indications in the text that suggest that
there are two main edifices on the stage: the palace of Oedipus, human king of
the city, and a shrine or altar to the god Apollo. The first is the dwelling from
which Oedipus and others emerge and to which he will eventually return at the
play’s end; the second is that altar to which Jocasta in a moment of religious
anxiety brings an offering. When the Priest enters with a group of citizens it is
not clear from the text whether they are there to visit their king’s palace or the
shrine. Is their appeal to be made to a man or a god? The Priest’s language in
addressing Oedipus betrays considerable concern that, even though the group
of citizens appear to have come to seek Oedipus’ intervention, they should not
approach him as a god but only as the first of men. While he is insistent on this
point (39-49), in a significant theatrical gesture both he and the citizen-suppli-
ants go down on their knees to Oedipus (49-51). 
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them in its restless and searching uncertainties. Oedipus’ ‘ambiguous status’
is not set in a context that is itself unambiguous or transparent in meaning,
just as dramatic ironies (in Oedipus any more than in Macbeth or King Lear)
do not allow the audience to rest in comfortable control of the truth. As lan-
guage itself came to be understood as a social phenomenon, and in Sopho-
cles’ own Athens seen to play new and distinct roles in democratic
processes,21 the linguistic ambiguities of this play relate to the ambiguities of
social being itself. If Oedipus is a special case, he is no less a representative
case. The Theban plague becomes a composite metaphor of infection and
threat, not only on the physical plane (though it is that too), but also as a
material/spiritual disease that infects man’s psychic existence. 
As Vernant and Vidal-Naquet have demonstrated, the ‘tragic moment’ at
Athens that took place over a rapidly changing century and witnessed an
extraordinary flowering of dramatic work derived at least partly from the fact
that Athens at that time experienced the excitement as well as the threats of
revolutionary change. The Athenians (and other intellectuals who made
Athens their home) began asking on what terms humans might conduct their
lives in the absence of the received concepts of earlier, theocratic societies—
the traditional cultures of the Hellenic world.22 But this feeling of newness
was experienced at a time when the discourses of that older world still had
power over the Athenian imagination, living on in memory and popular cul-
tural practices. Tragedies capture the tense complexities of that moment, and
its contradictions, without finally leaning to one side or the other.23 This is a
further way of grasping how Oedipus, more than any other individual on the
Greek tragic stage, represents the two faces of the new democracy. The ten-
sions between the two—on the one hand, oracles and prophets, gods and
their shrines, ritualistic curses and scape-goat expulsion; on the other hand,
the efforts of men to remain true to a belief in their capacity to understand the
seeming impossibility of the human predicament without recourse to the
divine—finally tear the hero apart. But that is a long way from saying that the
drama is reducible to a warning to the Athenians to turn back from the human
quest for truth and return to the certainties of religious faith. 
The reading of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King I am proposing starts from a
basic Brechtian tenet: the purpose of the drama should not simply be to place
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religious representations with the new modes of thought that char-
acterize the advent of law within the city-state.18
Within the text’s emerging patterns of incommensurate political and reli-
gious discourses, linguistic and dramatic ironies take on a wider signifi-
cance than simply to discredit Oedipus: they create an equivalent (and
modern) recognition of the arbitrariness of the signs of language. It is not
just Oedipus’ world that is threatened, but those bonds of kinship, religion,
politics, and language that enable the community to cohere. In the opening
words of the play, when Oedipus addresses the citizens as ‘My children,
newest descendants of Cadmus of old’,19 his assertion of genuine care and
the concern of a good patriarch for his people are instantly undermined by
his unconscious naming of his own progenitor, which reveals the darker
kinship he shares with these citizens. It foreshadows the dissolution of the
discrete categories of family relationships that forms the final tableau and
the play’s nightmarish conclusion. When he implicates himself in their
‘sickness’, the treachery of language’s autonomy subverts his simple
attempt to affirm the mutual concern he shares with his people.
In establishing a play of ironies right from the opening scene, the text
introduces an unsuspected third dimension that shadows Oedipus’ speech
and actions throughout. As Vernant and Vidal-Naquet argue:
The equivocal character of Oedipus’ words reflects the
ambiguous status that the drama confers upon him and on which
the entire tragedy rests. When Oedipus speaks he sometimes says
something other than or even the opposite of what he thinks he is
saying. The ambiguity of what he says does not reflect a duplicity
in his character, which is perfectly consistent, but, more pro-
foundly, the duality of his being.20
What needs to be added to this succinct statement is that the ontological
question posed by the play and confronting the spectator is not one that
attaches to Oedipus alone. That would make him everyone’s scapegoat and
thereby let us all off the hook. It includes the whole world of the play as well
as the spectators. Far from placing the spectators of the drama in a position
of comfortable superiority and removal from Oedipus’ plight, it engages
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account of how Laius died (i.e., that he was killed by ‘many robbers’). He
dwells on the reasons why that key witness, when finally brought on stage,
is not even asked the direct question: Was this the man who killed Laius?
Nor does this witness give any indication that Oedipus was Laius’ killer. As
Goodhart notes, criticism has often recognized the confusions in the narra-
tive between one murderer and many, but these are usually taken as part of
Sophocles’ technique for heightening suspense or thickening the pattern of
dramatic ironies that enmesh Oedipus. In contrast, Goodhart proposes the
scandalous possibility that Oedipus may not have killed Laius—or at least
that his guilt for the crime is not forensically proven in the play. He argues
that the assumption of Oedipus’ guilt is made in the face of contrary evi-
dence and represents a reversion to a myth-bound and oracular acceptance
of Oedipus’ destiny. In this reading the question of Oedipus’ guilt remains
indeterminate at the end of the play; from a purely forensic perspective,
Goodhart even appears to be arguing that Oedipus was not guilty of Laius’
murder. Traditional interpretations of the play rest on the assumption of
Oedipus’ double guilt: that is, the truth of the play is commensurate with the
prophecies told by the oracles. The question mark Goodhart places over the
ending of the play is to ask whether faith should be placed in oracular
authority or in the careful interpretation of evidence presented, the two now
being felt as incompatible. 
Traditional readings, ones that simply accept as a given that Oedipus
was guilty of parricide and incest, leave many reasonable questions unan-
swered. They unwittingly assume, for example, that Sophocles held a more
primitive belief in oracles (and not just gods) than did his most enlightened
contemporaries, and that his views are represented perfectly in the religious
anxieties of the Chorus. At a significant turning point of the action, the
Chorus baulks at the irreligious sentiments of Oedipus and particularly
Jocasta (954-97). At the level of construction—and here criticism has been
troubled—we may wonder why Sophocles introduced the complicated alter-
native narrative of Laius’ death only to resort to the awkward option of the
Corinthian messenger, who comes unannounced like a deus ex machina to
unravel the self-imposed complications of his plot. Finally, if the conclusion
to the play is neat and unequivocal, then Sophocles has run the serious risk
of jeopardizing both the suspense that drives the narrative and our respect
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on stage the terrible and tragic story of Oedipus’ doom, but to put into ques-
tion the assumption that that doom was always inevitable. Brecht was less
concerned with the individual destiny of the tragic hero than with the social
processes that determined that destiny, and less interested in unavoidable fate
than the necessity of changing a society that renders individual experience
tragic. Such a move entails not only adjusting the terms on which Sophocles’
most famous tragedy has been absorbed into world culture, but also relo-
cating him within Greek literary and cultural history itself. Put starkly, the
difference is between a conservative understanding of Sophocles and a pro-
gressive one. This challenge is not a new one: a much-respected classical
scholar of an earlier era, E. R. Dodds, once called Sophocles ‘the last great
exponent of the archaic world-view’, and a poet who affirmed the values of
an older theocratic and aristocratic society at the moment it had entered its
final, tragic stage.24 Dodds argued that the values of the heroic age, touched
by the ‘new accent of despair’ of the so-called ‘Archaic age’ that lay between
Homer and the fifth century BCE, persist as historical vestiges in Sophocles.
If true, this would seriously damage claims for Sophocles’ modernity, and
justify Dodds’ placement of the tragedian in a direct line from Theognis, a
poet who bemoaned the lost privileges of his class with the onset of social
change. It is against these still prevalent assumptions of an austerely aristo-
cratic and backward-looking Sophocles that I wish to place a more question-
able and questioning Oedipus. This involves a fundamental re-thinking of the
relationship between tragedy and myth.
Who killed Laius?
To consider Sophocles’ Oedipus as a representative figure of democratic
Athens, we need to ask how much potential for truth the play grants to the
forensic mode of inquiry. This is partly what Sandor Goodhart did in the
1970s when he proposed a ‘positive’ interpretation of Sophocles’ play that
begins by trusting the forensic evidence presented in the play. One way of
describing the changed position of the spectators that this implies is to
regard them not as ‘little Oedipuses’ but as astute jurors who are attentive to
the evidence presented.25 Goodhart’s radical reading—which challenges the
interpretations both of traditional classicists and of Freudian psycho-
analysis—begins by taking seriously the much-circulated eyewitness
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Oedipus himself) all work to deflect the audience’s attention away from the
thought that Oedipus may not be the guilty one; at the same time, they fall
short of clinching the verdict of Oedipus’ guilt. Then there are other well-
placed suggestions, such as the witness’s discomfort on returning to Thebes
when he found Oedipus installed on the throne. Oedipus asks Jocasta who
was that witness ‘at the place where three roads meet’:
JOCASTA:
A servant who reached home, the lone survivor.
OEDIPUS:
So, could he still be in the palace—even now?
JOCASTA:
No indeed. Soon as he returned from the scene
And saw you on the throne with Laius dead and gone
He knelt and clutched my hand, pleading with me
To send him into the hinterlands, to pasture, 
Far as possible, out of sight of Thebes. I sent him away. Slave 
that he was,
he’d earned that favour—and much more.
(832-40)
Jocasta’s last allusion is to the role that same servant had played in
removing the baby Oedipus from Thebes. The details she provides con-
cerning his departure from Thebes suggest a possible explanation of the
man’s prevarications over what happened at the cross-roads: he recognized
the new king as the killer of Laius and was afraid. But this raises further
problems that I shall soon address. At this stage it is enough to note that, in
terms of the good faith or not of this witness, they are suggestive but not
conclusive. The effect produced by this play of half-truths against the too
ready availability of a narrative conclusion that vindicates the oracle’s
prophecies is uncanny. For that reason, it should disturb rather than consoli-
date the audience’s sense of certitude.
A clear-cut narrative conclusion, on the other hand, should also raise
doubts over the traditional high evaluation of the play and its nature as
tragedy. A neatly rounded conclusion with no loose ends contrasts sharply
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for Oedipus’ intelligence by foreshadowing a conclusion of Oedipal guilt at
least as early as the Teiresias scene. As Brecht recognizes, the result of
repressing such doubts is to leave us with an Oedipus that is more like a
Medieval Morality play than a Shakespearean tragedy, with Oedipus pre-
sented as a kind of Greek Everyman. Goodhart’s Oedipus points to a more
fascinating and dynamic drama than that.
His central perception is that the inclusion of a complex and sustained
sub-narrative that casts doubt on Oedipus’ identification as the murderer of
Laius reveals a basic equivocation in the way Sophocles presents the mythic
material. Far from being a simple representation of the myth, in his reading
the play’s action produces a critical assault on the mythopoeic habit of mind.
What the play dramatizes is not the way Oedipus comes to recognize the
truth of his foretold guilt but the genesis of the myth itself; its detail is
directed towards anatomizing the mental distortions that lead Oedipus and
everyone on stage to accept the truth presented by the oracle and obliquely
reiterated by Teiresias. Mythic consciousness is thus shown to depend on an
original act of denial.
One response to the question of why Sophocles does not have his
Herdsman-witness finally confirm that his early story was untrue is that the
unexpected arrival of the Corinthian messenger alters the direction of the
dramatic narrative so sharply that the final, legalistic proof of Oedipus’ guilt
of the murder is unnecessary. The murder inquiry has been overtaken by a
broader search for Oedipus’ identity, so that once it is revealed that he is the
child of Laius and Jocasta, and consequently guilty of the greater abomina-
tion of incestuous marriage with his mother, the technical detail of spelling
out the fact that he also happens to be his father’s murderer would seem to
be almost redundant, a clumsiness that Sophocles had the artistic tact to
avoid. The audience, following the powerful logic established through the
play’s complex narrative patterns, assumes with Oedipus that he must be the
murderer, and that the oracles given to Laius and Oedipus have been vindi-
cated. But the textual details that encourage such acceptance are open to
multiple interpretations. The suggestive puns and verbal coincidences (e.g.,
that Oedipus will seek out the murderer with the same zeal that he would on
behalf of his own father, or the physical resemblance of the man killed to
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‘history’ refers to the narration of those events (historia rerum gestarum).
Freud’s famous description of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King makes a similar
distinction: he compares the play to the progression of psychoanalytic treat-
ment, as ‘a process of revealing, with cunning delays and ever-mounting
excitement’ what in fact Oedipus had done. In the classical detective story
the climactic moment is reached when the detective announces the solution
to the mystery in the same way that Oedipus at the climax of the play
becomes both accuser and accused and declares his own double guilt. At
such a moment fabula and sjuzhet are meant to come together, the mystery
solved and the gap closed. In the alternative reading I am proposing the gap
is not closed, not quite. Freud too knows that the ‘successful’ conclusion of
psychoanalysis is unlikely ever to take the form of a simple ‘Eureka-effect’.
In this reading the pivotal scene is not the one involving the Corinthian
messenger who brings news of the death of Oedipus’ supposed father, King
Polybus of Corinth, followed by the Herdsman who turns out to be both the
servant who years earlier had taken the infant Oedipus and exposed him on
the slopes of Mount Cithaeron and later witnessed Laius’ murder. Rather,
the more important turning point occurs in the earlier scene between
Oedipus and Jocasta. This great scene is one of the most intimate and
domestic in ancient literature (767-953). Within its warmth and atmosphere
of mutual concern and trust, Oedipus’ life and deeds are placed under
intense scrutiny. From the spectator’s point of view, it also has the feeling of
an accused under cross-examination, put in the witness seat. In forensic
terms, this is the moment when Oedipus presents his major testimony. In its
quiet solemnity the scene has the ring of truth. Oedipus holds back nothing;
there is no indication that he is prevaricating in any way. Its most important
disclosures come involuntarily, as it were, and even accidentally, against the
intentions of both parties in the dialogue. 
Jocasta has interrupted the angry exchange between her brother Creon
and her husband in which Oedipus accused Creon as well as the prophet
Teiresias of conspiracy against him. This elicits Jocasta’s contempt for
prophecy: she cites the Delphic oracle’s prophecy regarding the child of
herself and Laius and how they thwarted its horrible prediction by exposing
the child to die on the mountainside. In this she repeats a central ambiva-
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with the final effect of most of the great tragedies: in Macbeth, for example,
Malcolm’s summary of the Macbeths as ‘this dead butcher and his fiend-like
queen’ is manifestly inadequate; likewise, the delicate hopefulness of the
last scene of Eumenides is hedged around with uncertainties. But there are
more loose ends in Sophocles’ drama than at first meet the eye: the ‘slipper-
iness’ of the text is not confined to one or two gaps of detail or failures to
wrap up every unexplained contradiction in the narrative.
Narratology to the rescue
Shortly after Goodhart published his account of Oedipus, Jonathan Culler
harnessed that interpretation for the purpose of re-directing the agenda for
narrative theory.26 Culler’s discussion begins by questioning the exclusive
assumption that the central distinction narratology should address was that
between the narrative content (the real or fictitious ‘events’) and narrative
perspective. Most studies of narrative were preoccupied with the position of
the narrator in the telling: the narrative ‘point of view’. Culler sought to
break down the assumptions of such an ordering by re-introducing cate-
gories first used by Russian Formalists in the 1920s that put into question
this reasonable distinction. He adopts their distinction between fabula and
sjuzhet as the dual components of narrative and examines three narratives in
which the assumption of the priority of fabula (the events that ‘happened’,
thought of in chronological order) over sjuzhet (the specific ways a partic-
ular retrospective narrative organizes the telling of these events). The differ-
ences between ‘story’ and ‘plot’ turn on a similar distinction, even though
many of the associated terms are used in different and contradictory ways.
The classic form of the detective story illustrates Culler’s distinction. The
narrative we read is the story of the revelation of the truth about the murder
mystery: the hero of this narrative (sjuzhet) is the master detective; the
‘story’ is propelled by the discovery of a body accompanied by signs of vio-
lence. The fabula to which this narrative alludes is the story of the murder
itself, which is gradually put together in the second-stage narrative—the
story of bringing the truth to light (in this respect, Sophocles’ play certainly
follows the lines of a classical detective story). This distinction parallels the
two meanings of the word ‘history’: the ‘primary’ meaning is that ‘history’
signifies the events that happened (res gestae); the second meaning is that
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treacherous text, contains more slippages than the one to which Oedipus
clings. Because these elements of conflicting narrative detail are not recog-
nized by him, but are available to the attentive spectator/juror, their weight
as truthful testimony is increased. 
One such detail prefigures the Freudian unconscious. When Oedipus
flees Delphi to evade the fate spelt out for him by the oracle, he simply
forgets that it was a doubt about his parentage that drove him to Delphi in
the first place. Another is the extraordinary and casual mention of his killing
the whole party of strangers at the crossroads. This massacre and Oedipus’
telling of it are so shocking that most commentators fail to notice its greater
value as evidence, which is a further source of its uncanny power. If his
account is true—and we are given no reason to doubt that it is so—then
Oedipus must be describing a different event from the one reported by the
witness: as he tells it, he has left no witnesses to relate the story.27 His failure
to notice, let alone capitalize on, this fact further adds to its truth-value as
evidence. Once the story of the robbers is taken seriously, that is, then other
elements that appear to confirm the assumption of Oedipus’ guilt begin to
unravel. One of these can be noted in terms of the fabula/sjuzhet distinction.
If the purpose of the play’s narrative is to reconstruct the real life events of
many years before, there is one question that is hard to answer on the basis
of what is presented: Who reached Thebes first, Oedipus or the witness? If it
were Oedipus, how was it that Thebes could make him their king as a
reward for solving the riddle of the Sphinx before they had heard of the
news that King Laius was dead, thus leaving the throne vacant? When and
to whom did this witness tell his story? These and other confusing discrep-
ancies may not finally prove anything one way or another, but they con-
tribute to a pattern of uncertainty that blurs the apparently clear-cut conclu-
sion that Oedipus is Laius’ killer. Nietzsche may have this kind of effect in
mind when he talks of the deceptive clarity that is the very essence of
Sophocles’ poetic power: 
The language of the Sophoclean heroes surprises us by its Apol-
lonian determinacy and lucidity. It seems to us that we can
fathom their innermost being, and we are somewhat surprised
that we had such a short way to go. However, once we abstract
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lence of the play, paradoxically evincing a belief in the power of the oracle
even as she expresses contempt for such practices (a true disbeliever would
have no need to take such drastic steps). A similar equivocation occurs at the
end of the scene: having shocked the Chorus with her blasphemous mockery
of the power of priests and oracles, she returns soon after to make a propi-
tiatory offering at the shrine of Apollo. But as she tells the story of the expo-
sure of her child she includes a circumstantial detail that propels the narra-
tive in an entirely different direction. She argues that her child could not
have killed the king, because Laius was murdered by robbers ‘at a place
where three roads meet’ (790). Listening with the attention of a good analyst
(or great detective), Oedipus looks beyond her controlling narrative and
latches onto this apparently insignificant detail. The ‘crossroads’ turns out to
be the very place where Oedipus himself had killed a man bearing a close
resemblance to Laius and around the very time the King was reported killed.
Anxious now about that coincidence of place, Oedipus presents to
Jocasta another narrative—Homeric in tone—of his own life up until his
encounter with a group of strangers at the crossroads. Like Odysseus at the
court of the King of the Phaeacians, he begins his story: ‘My father was
Polybus, king of Corinth. / My mother, a Dorian, Merope’ (852-53). He tells
how a drunken man at a banquet claimed that he was not the child of those
parents he lived with; that this disturbed him so much that he went to Delphi
in search of the truth; there he received an oracle concerning his own destiny
that partly corresponds with that given to Laius; but this time the prophecy
included the crime of incest as well as parricide. Horrified, Oedipus deter-
mines to avoid that ghastly fate by distancing himself forever from his (sup-
posed) parents. His journey away from both Delphi and Corinth brings him
to the fatal encounter at the place ‘where three roads meet’. 
Next he gives Jocasta a very precise account of what took place there.
This statement represents the most salient testimony on which a jury might
condemn or acquit Oedipus of the murder of Laius. Having told a story that
predisposes him to believe in his own guilt, Oedipus clings to the detail that
the witness had referred to a group of robbers, not just one man. He seizes
on this account of Laius’ death in the desperate belief that the discrepancy
will establish his innocence. But this speech, like so much else in this play’s
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The second interpretation is the most famous and influential reading of
the play, that of Sigmund Freud. Freud follows Nietzsche to the extent that
he locates the meaning of the drama in the profundity of its mythic content.
For Freud the power of the play derives from the fact that the myth reminds
every member of the audience of their own earliest desires. It awakens the
buried truth that each person in their infancy once experienced what
Oedipus did: the twin desires to be their mother’s lover and their father’s
killer, thus revealing the parents as the first objects of their undeveloped
sexual desire and aggression. The repression of those desires opens a way
(as if by compensation) for the human subject to develop within the pow-
erful structures of Language and the Law, or what Jacques Lacan would des-
ignate the Symbolic Order. If for Freud that proper resolution of the
‘Oedipus conflict’ marks the subject’s entry into culture and knowledge, this
is at best an ambivalent gain that can also lead to the formation of extreme
psychic disorders. Oedipus fails to understand the nature of the malaise that
afflicts both himself and Thebes; in a similar way, the Freudian analysand
must struggle to reach that knowledge through a process of analysis that
Freud likens to the ‘cunning delays and ever mounting excitement’ of
Sophocles’ drama. Like Nietzsche, Freud sees the profound meaning of the
drama as deriving from its mythic content; but it is in the text of the play
that he discovers the very structure of psychoanalytic analysis. Many classi-
cists have dismissed Freud’s linking of his Oedipal theory to Sophocles on
the grounds that Oedipus did not really manifest ‘Oedipal’ symptoms
because he was entirely unaware of the nature of his relationships to his
parents.31 But that is to take the theory too literally. For one thing, Freud is
talking of the resonances of the myth in its most basic structure and not a
realist representation. Then, at the level of the text, Freud is clearly struck
by the similarity between his own emergent theories derived from his ear-
liest treatment of neurotic patients and the narrative processes of Sophocles’
drama. To discover these similarities, Freud needed to read the play and its
central character as subjects available for analysis, and to bring the analyst’s
attention to bear on the emerging narrative.
The third interpretation, of Jonathan Culler, while not entirely separable
from psychoanalytic interests, directs attention more exclusively to the text
and away from its mythic underpinnings or antecedents. He accepts Good-
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from the character of the hero as it rises to the surface and
becomes visible … and instead penetrate to the myth which is
projected in these luminous reflections, we suddenly come up
against a phenomenon which is the exact opposite of a familiar
optical one. After the energetic attempt to focus on the sun, we
have, by way of remedy almost, dark spots before our eyes.28
A conclusion in which nothing is concluded
One of the few literary works to match Sophocles’ Oedipus the King in
terms of the plenitude of interpretations it has spawned is Joseph Conrad’s
Heart of Darkness. Like Conrad’s novella, Sophocles’ tragedy has produced an
interpretative ‘chain’ that is seemingly inexhaustible.29 No single interpretation
ever seems adequate to stabilize the meaning of such texts. Oedipus the King
remains an open text, which continues to baffle even as it mesmerizes the atten-
tion of readers and theatregoers. Having addressed a range of somewhat sur-
prising and even eccentric possibilities in the play (Oedipus did not kill his
father! Sophocles did not after all produce a play that is perfect in form!), I will
therefore conclude in an appropriately open-ended way by considering just
four different conclusions as to what the play might plausibly mean.
Firstly, there is Friedrich Nietzsche’s rich and suggestive discussion of
Sophocles, from which the passage quoted above is taken. Nietzsche calls
Oedipus ‘the greatest sufferer of the Greek stage’ and frames the problem of
the play’s meaning as a somewhat ‘Delphic’ question: ‘Oedipus, his father’s
murderer, his mother’s lover, solver of the Sphinx’s riddle! What is the
meaning of this triple fate?’30 He goes on to meditate on an ancient Persian
idea that a true magus must be incestuously begotten, for insight into the
secrets of nature is only granted to those that transgress ‘the consecrated
tables of the natural order’. This conclusion links Oedipus to the prophet
Teiresias, whose knowledge transcends the bounds of time and derives sim-
ilarly from the ‘queerness’ of the blind prophet’s experience. Teiresias too
had transgressed the ‘natural categories’ of sex: having once been turned
into a woman and then back again into a man, he was positioned to know the
answer to one of the unanswerable conundrums, whether it is the man or the
woman who has the greater pleasure in heterosexual intercourse. 
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One of the striking things about the history of this ritual and its relevance to
Sophocles’ drama was that the one unfortunately chosen for sacrifice could be
the very highest person in the land (the king) or the lowest (a criminal). 
By the time of Sophocles, these rituals had either been completely erad-
icated or transformed into a merely symbolic version of the violent sacrifice.
On the other hand, the older ritual is echoed in one of the strange aspects of
the Athenian democracy: the practice of ostracism. The purpose of ostracism
was to enable the state to resolve an unresolvable dispute. The procedure
involved first taking a vote in the assembly as to whether there should be a
process of ostracism in any given year. If the vote were positive, the next
thing would be to determine who was to be ostracized. The last time
ostracism was practiced in Athens was in 416 BCE, when it failed to resolve
an impasse over policy for conducting the Peloponnesian War. The two
leaders who were at odds were Nicias and Alcibiades; but when the vote
produced a different candidate altogether for ostracizing, the failure of the
process to resolve that political deadlock led to its abandonment. In terms of
other contemporary reference points for Sophocles’ Oedipus, the likely date
of its production in the early stages of the War also saw Athens decide not to
consult Delphi any more, in the belief that the oracle was under the influ-
ence of their enemies. In the end such historical facts cannot prove anything
one way or another; but they can certainly remind us that the Athenian
tragedies were played to an audience that was caught up in major social
changes involving life and death issues, and that the theatre was one of the
prime cultural spaces, shared by the stage performers and an audience of
their fellow citizens, where the city’s anxieties were played out.
If the appeal to historical and cultural context cannot resolve questions of
interpretation, they nevertheless offer some illumination of the conditions for
interpretation. The discussion of the pharmakos ritual, for example, throws
some light on otherwise puzzling or obscure moments in the play. One of
these is the kommos that follows the altercation between Oedipus and
Creon.34 The abrupt change of direction this produces is effected by Sopho-
cles’ use of one of the formal dramaturgical modes available to the poet. It is
interesting to speculate whether in this case the kommos could produce an
effect akin to Brechtian ‘estrangement’. The quasi-realistic speech rhythms
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hart’s insights into the text’s narrative ambiguities and then links the narra-
tive conundrum exposed by Goodhart to Freud’s case history of ‘the
Wolfman’.32 In his narrative of that case, Freud determines that this patient’s
suffering is related to the shocking early-life experience of witnessing his
parents copulating. But this ‘primary’ scene is presented at several removes.
With the more advanced knowledge than the young child had at the time of
that imagined event, some set of circumstances, perhaps only obliquely con-
nected, has re-triggered the original trauma. After the process of analysis has
led the patient back through layers of ‘repressed memory’, in an extraordi-
nary final comment Freud states that it does not matter whether the primary
event actually happened. The important thing is that the effect was there,
whether it was based on an actual event or not. Culler concludes that the
dénouement of the Sophoclean drama need not be based absolutely on the
(prior) fact of Oedipus killing his father; rather, it is the necessary and only
viable conclusion because the narrative demands that it be so. For that
reason, he concludes, the real or fictitious events in a particular narrative
only have to assume a prior reality for the narrative to proceed; to put it
another way, it is the narrative that determines the ‘facts’ of the case, not the
other way around. As in the contentious legal area of appealing to repressed
memories to unearth evidence of a heinous crime, transposing the ‘evi-
dence’ of narrative necessity into a forensic field whose purpose is veridical
might involve a fundamental category confusion.
The fourth interpretation is that of Sandor Goodhart himself, which has
greatly influenced this discussion. In his highly original article, Goodhart
draws very different conclusions from the three I have summarized above.
Relying on René Girard’s anthropological work on the social significance of
scape-goat rituals (pharmakos),33 Goodhart interprets Sophocles’ play as
dramatizing not the mythic material of Oedipus slaying his father and
wedding his mother but the process whereby Oedipus came to believe that
such was the case. When he finally assumes his own guilt and abandons his
resistance to the prophecies of priests, prophets, and oracles, he accepts the
position of the scapegoat: he takes on the burden of guilt for the accumulated
violence of the city. Goodhart (with Girard) thus sees the play as structured in
terms of the primitive ritual in which first a human citizen and in later versions
an animal was cruelly slain on behalf (as it were) of the whole community.
Sydney Studies
38
repeats the terms both of his curse on whoever is found guilty of Laius’
murder (death or banishment) and the treatment meted out to the pharmakos
victim. Later in the play, the possibility of death is dropped and replaced by
banishment alone, thus bringing the play closer to the contemporary proce-
dure of ostracism. But the final outcome of the drama remains uncertain: the
closing scene, far from demonstrating the efficacy of ritual for cleansing the
city of Thebes of its pollution by banishing Oedipus, presents the new leader
Creon in a state of uncertainty as to what action to take regarding Oedipus.
The devastated family simply go back inside the Palace. On the evidence of
Sophocles’ other Theban plays alone, this is not the moment when the woes
that beset Thebes were resolved once and for all. 
The only conclusion about Oedipus the King that can be drawn with con-
fidence is that it instantiates the truth that when religious faith is giving way to
rational inquiry, as long as there remains a tension between these two mutu-
ally exclusive discourses, conclusions regarding the most fundamental ques-
tions of life and death are impossible. The particular new consensus that is yet
to come into being may depend on accepting the insight that henceforth the
interpretative process will know no closure. Oedipus the King tantalizes its
audience with such a prospect. That is one reason why it is hard to categorize
the play itself in terms of its being either ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’.
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of the dialogue between the two Theban leaders who are the husband and
brother of Jocasta are broken by the kommos, a sequence of lyrical verses
performed in music and dance between Oedipus and the Chorus. The effect
such a formal break might have had in the Greek theatre is irrecoverable; but
even in translation the words retain something of that strangeness:
CHORUS:
Believe it, be sensible
Give way, my king, I beg you!
OEDIPUS:
What do you want from me, concessions?
CHORUS:
Respect him—he’s been no fool in the past
And now he’s strong with the oath he swears to god.
OEDIPUS:
You know what you’re asking?
CHORUS:
I do.
OEDIPUS:
Then out with it!
CHORUS:
The man’s your friend, your kin, he’s under oath—
Don’t cast him out, disgraced
Branded with guilt on the strength of hearsay only.
OEDIPUS:
Know full well, if that is what you want
You want me dead or banished from the land. (725-35)
After this exchange Oedipus’ anger does not completely abate but the dra-
matic narrative is re-directed. The most intriguing moment in the dialogue is
his final statement, that the Chorus’s demand that he drop his accusations
against Creon is tantamount to asking him to become himself the guilty party.
In terms of the requirements of the pharmakos ritual, this seems to imply that
one of these two must occupy the place of the scapegoat. Oedipus’ statement
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(London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 169-87.
27 A movie of Sophocles’ play, directed by Philip Saville, with Christopher
Plummer as Oedipus and Orson Welles a memorable Teiresias, noticing the
problem of the single witness who escaped the massacre, resolved it in this
way. Each time the play touched on the ‘place where three roads meet’ and
what happened there, the actor playing Oedipus would drift into a semi-
daze and a flashback would bring back the events with ever-increasing
clarity. In Oedipus’ final recollection, one man amidst all the turmoil is
shown running into hiding but unnoticed by Oedipus. This ‘resolution’ is
only achieved by introducing a detail not present in the text in order to
paper over what seems an accidental discrepancy.
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nistically generates meanings that don’t properly belong to that original
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10 Segal is very clear on the importance of this confusion of numbers by
Oedipus: Tragedy and Civilization, pp. 214-16.
11 Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays, trans. Robert Fagles (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1982). All further quotations from the play are taken from this
translation and indicated in the text by line numbers.
12 See H. W. Parke, Greek Oracles (London: Hutchinson, 1967).
13 Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient
Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd, rev. edn (New York: Zone Books, 1990), pp. 23-28.
14 One case for seeing Oedipus as embodying the essence of Thebes itself (and
by extension, Athens) is made in Bernard Knox, Oedipus at Thebes (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).
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28 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals,
trans. Francis Golffing (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 59.
29 See Slavoj Zizek, Sublime Object, pp. 213-15. Reversing the commonly
held view that the meaning of a complex text is immanent in an imaginary
‘original’ moment of response that has been lost through the process of
interpretation, Zizek argues for the importance of the ‘interpretative tradi-
tion’ in establishing the ‘meaning’ in the fullness of its possibilities. 
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34 A kommos is described in the Liddell and Scott Greek Lexicon as ‘a dirge
or lamentation sung in turn by one of the actors and the Chorus’. The inclu-
sion of a kommos was not a formal requirement for the tragedian, but a
variation available for composition. It was thus a recognizable feature of
tragedies. That does not exclude the ‘estranging’ effect I am claiming for
this moment in Oedipus the King. 
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Prime-time Drama: Canterbury Tales
for the Small Screen
MARGARET ROGERSON
What Chaucer needs is intelligent popularization and 
a good television adaptation.1
There have been many attempts to popularize Chaucer in modern times. In
his informative study entitled Chaucer at Large, Steve Ellis has provided a
detailed account of the progress of such efforts over roughly a hundred years
to the end of the twentieth century.2 But despite his claim that ‘Chaucer has
not really taken hold of the public in any sustained manner’,3 interest in rein-
venting the poet and, in particular, appropriating his most famous literary
undertaking, The Canterbury Tales, is so great that further important devel-
opments have already occurred in the few years since the publication of
Ellis’s book, especially in the area of performance.4 The Chaucer industry
continues to offer its wares in the public market place and within the walls
of the academy, but there remains a consensus of opinion, both general and
academic, that Chaucer is ‘very under-read’.5 Peter Mack, reviewing no less
than four new books of Chaucerian scholarship in 1996, lamented that the
medieval poet ‘has the misfortune to be read today mainly by professionals’
and called for a ‘good television adaptation’ to redress the situation.6
By the turn of the century the British Broadcasting Corporation had pro-
duced no less than three major television versions of Chaucer’s best known
work, two of these long before Mack was writing (in 1969 and 1975) and
the third, shortly afterwards, an educational series of animated Canterbury
Tales completed over a two year period (1998-2000) that was distinguished
by being nominated for an Academy Award in 1999.7 Mack may not have
been satisfied by this cartoon-style pilgrimage because it was aimed at
‘family viewing’8 and was, perhaps, somewhat too narrowly focussed to
achieve the kind of ‘popularization’ he had in mind. Not all of the critics
were charmed by it, with one feeling he ‘ought to be kind to … a lovingly
